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Summary 
State and local officials are looking for ways to relieve the 
problems of economic distress in nonmetropolitan areas. Many have 
offered financial incentives to companies to affect their location, 
expansion, and hiring decisions. 
What are the effects of such efforts? A critical review of 
existing studies yields the following generalizations for programs 
with no explicit geographic target within the state and for programs 
aimed at specific geographic areas. 
1. The effects of programs with no explicit geographic target within 
a state. 
a. Do programs affect firms' location and expansion decisions? 
Programs rarely affect the initial decision to relocate or 
expand or the choice of a region for location. They do 
occasionally influence the choice of a specific site in one 
town compared to a similar site in a nearby town where other 
considerations, such as labor force and transportation, are 
nearly the same. 
b. Do programs affect the level of growth in a state? Studies 
of statewide economic effects of programs show small 
positive effects or no effects at all. 
c. How do programs affect the distressed regions of a state? 
Programs that ~re not specifically aimed at distressed areas 
are used disproportionately in the growing areas of a state, 
that is, in the regions with the fewest economic problems. 
2. The effects of programs aimed at specific geographic areas. 
Evaluations of state programs have shown few effects on 
distressed areas even when programs are aimed at these regions. 
Federal financial incentive programs aimed at distressed areas 
were small and had little effect on the regions' economies. In 
contrast, British programs for distressed areas have had more 
favorable effects; evaluations show that programs did direct 
growth toward these regions. No one has considered what lessons 
the British experience might hold for American efforts. 
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Existing studies offer few, if any, explanations for the results 
of programs. What needs to be done to help understand the workings of 
financial assistance programs and their promise for helping distressed 
nonmetropolitan economies? Evaluations should address different 
questions than they have in the past. 
1. Evaluations need to address the issue of whether financial aid 
programs for businesses are the best way to encourage growth of 
regions or to enhance the welfare of people living in distressed 
areas. They need to do so through direct comparisons between 
financial assistance programs and other kinds of approaches. 
2. Evaluations need to look more closely at the character of 
economic change that financial assistance programs encourage. 
Qualitative transformations of a regional economy in, for 
instance, the geographic pattern of ownership of economic 
activity, can have major effects on the capacity of the economy 
to respond to future change in ways that help local residents. 
3. Evaluations need a broader social, political, and institutional 
context in order to explain the results of programs. To suggest 
directions for policy makers, studies must include better 
explanations for results than they have in the past. In 
particular, studies need to assess why some parts of programs 
are more effective than others. Further, they need to provide 
explanations grounded in politics as well as economics, for these 
are government programs. Finally, evaluations should deal 
directly with the question of what should be done differently to 
produce better results. 
In the 1980s nonmetropolitan economies have come under enormous 
stress. Declines in major industrial sectors important to rural areas 
have lowered incomes and raised unemployment in many parts of the 
nation. Falling agricultural exports have cut farm incomes and farm 
land values in many agriculturally dependent communities, and 
especially in regions that produce cash grains and corn. Lower oil 
prices have curtailed the oil and gas exploration and production 
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boom in North Dakota, Texas, Oklahoma, and Montana. Demand for 
Northern Great Plains coal has been similarly reduced. Problems 
in manufacturing have meant high unemployment rates in rural, 
manufacturing-dependent counties in the South and East. 1 
Changes in agricultural fortunes illustrate the effects such 
declines can have on local economies. According to a report by 
Thomas Stinson for the U.S. Senate, farm income in nine agricul-
turally dependent counties in southwestern Minnesota peaked at more 
than $372 million in 1973 but had slumped to only $141 million in 
1983, $80 million less than the region's residents received from 
transfer payments. Because of such massive drops in income, local 
merchants have lost sales, cut back employment, and closed businesses. 
According to Stinson, if the high agricultural incomes of 1974-77 had 
continued, the southwestern ~innesota counties would have had about 
3,650 more downtown commercial sector jobs than they had in 1986. 
Actual employment in these sectors in 1983 was 23,099. 2 
The decline in the economic base of norunetropolitan areas has 
widened income and employment disparities between metropolitan and 
nonmetropolitan areas. In Minnesota, for example, personal income 
1Rural Economic Development in the 1980's: Preparing for the 
Future, Agricultural and Rural Economy Division, Economic Research 
Service, Staff Report No. AGES870724, U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
July 1987, "Executive Summary." 
2Thomas F. Stinson, 
Survive the Farm Crisis? 
Affairs, 99th Cong., 2nd 
Governing the Heartland: Can Rural Economies 
U.S. Senate, Committee on Goverrunental 
sess., July 1986, Appendix B. 
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is increasingly concentrated in the principal metropolitan area of 
Minneapolis and St. Paul. The metropolitan area had 56.4 percent of 
state personal income in 1979 and 58.4 percent in 1984, although not 
quite half the state's population lived in the Twin Cities region by 
1984. Outside the metropolitan area, income growth occurred dispro-
portionately in the larger communities. Between 1976 and 1984 the 
Twin Cities area increased its share of the state's jobs in manu-
facturing; retail trade; wholesale trade in durables; finance, 
insurance and real estate; and services. 3 
This paper first describes briefly the state and local govern-
ment response to these problems through efforts to promote economic 
development by providing_business financing. The paper then 
summarizes what is known about the effects of programs to provide 
financial incentives and the reasons for the effects, with special 
attention to nonmetropolitan areas. The evidence shows that such 
programs have had little or no favorable effect on nonmetropolitan 
economies and may even have helped to redistribute growth from 
depressed areas to growing ones. However, no studies have explained 
adequately why the programs have these effects or what should be done 
to make the programs work better. 
3Tom Gillaspy and Don Feeney, "Regional Economic Disparities," 
and Bob Eleff, "The Geography of Job Growth" in 1987 Economic Report 
to the Governor, State of Minnesota, St. Paul, Minn., Dec. 1986. 
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Public Financial Incentives for Investment 
Public officials are responding to the problems of distressed 
nonmetropolitan areas with programs to stimulate local development. 
In Iowa, for example, in response to the troubles caused by the 
decline in agriculture and agriculture-related industries, the state 
legislature adopted sweeping economic development measures during the 
three legislative sessions from 1984 through 1986. 4 In Minnesota, the 
legislature established the Greater Minnesota Corporation in 1987 to 
invest in research and development and business expansion in rural 
areas of the state. This measure, along with others adopted at the 
same time, expanded the state's role in financing economic 
development. 5 
Programs to help depressed local economies take many forms, but 
among the most common are efforts to affect the location and amount of 
businesses' capital investment by providing financial assistance. The 
most prevalent types of such aid are tax incentives and industrial 
revenue bonds. By 1986, for example, 45 states had authorized the use 
of industrial revenue bonds by cities and towns to finance certain 
kinds of expenditures for some industrial sectors. A city, town, or 
public authority could then issue bonds for specific industrial 
4Mark Fox, "Planning for Economic Development: A Regional 
Approach," a Plan B paper submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the Master of Planning in Public Affairs, Humphrey 
Institute of Public Affairs, University of Minnesota, July 1987. 
5chapter 386, S. F. No. 1, "Rural Development; Greater Minnesota 
Corporation; Mineral Resources Program; Community Development," 
Laws of Minnesota, 75th legislature, 1987 regular session. 
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projects. Thirty-two states authorized property tax abatements 
(see Table 1 for a more detailed summary). 6 From a state 
government's perspective, such subsidies to firms are not discre-
tionary. That is, no one in state government makes a decision about 
whether a particular project merits the subsidy; such decisions are 
left to local governments or authorities. Legislation that authorizes 
programs can direct aid to certain types of regions, to nonmetro-
politan areas with certain characteristics, for instance. In only 
eight states, however, were property tax exemptions aimed at specific 
kinds of areas.7 
State government agencies also administer programs that provide 
considerable opportunity for discretion about the activities that 
receive subsidies. By 1986, 14 states offered grants as one of their 
industrial incentives. Twenty-six states offered direct state loans; 
25 states provided for the state government to issue industrial 
revenue bonds (see Table 1). 8 When a state government agency directly 
administers programs, the agency has greater potential to aim assis-
tance at certain industries, types of businesses, or regions of the 
6National Association of State Development Agencies et al., 
Directory of Incentives for Business Investment and Development in 
the United States: A State-by-State Guide (Washington, D.C.: Urban 
Institute Press, 1983 and 1986). For a longer term view of the 
incentives states have provided or authorized, see Benjamin Bridges, 
Jr., "State and Local Inducements for Industry, Part I," National Tax 
Journal, vol. 18, no. 1 (March 1965), pp. 1-14. 
7Gregory H. Wassall and Daryl A. Hellman, "Financial Incentives 
to Industry and Urban Economic Development," Policy Studies Review, 
vol. 4, no. 4 (May 1985), p. 629. 
8National Association of State Development Agencies et al., 
Directory of Incentives for Business. 
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Table 1 
Number of States Offering Financial Incentives 
for Capital Investment in 1986 
Incentive 
Grants 
Debt instruments 
Direct interest subsidies 
Loans 
Direct state loans 
Private development credit corporations 
Industrial revenue bonds 
State issued 
Locally issued 
General obligation bonds 
Umbrella bonds 
Loan guarantees 
Industrial revenue bond guarantees 
Equity and near-equity financing 
State chartered equity/venture capital 
. corporations 
Tax exemptions, credits, deductions, 
and special treatment 
Investment tax credits 
Property tax abatements 
Business inventory 
Goods in transit 
Research and development 
Number of 
States 
14 
0 
26 
11 
25 
45 
4 
15 
15 
9 
8 
20 
32 
35 
42 
14 
Sources: National Association of State Development Agencies et al., 
Directory of Incentives for Business Investment and Development in 
the United States: A State-by-State Guide (Washington, D.C.: Urban 
Institute Press, 1986); Larry C. Ledebur et al., "Recommendations for 
a Cost-Effective Business Incentive Program for Louisiana," prepared 
for Louisiana Department of Commerce, unpublished, (Oct. 31, 1983), 
p. 5. 
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state--for example, to try to encourage development in nonmetropolitan 
areas. In 1985, however, only 11 states reported that their economic 
development efforts aimed to encourage development in specific 
geographic areas. 9 
State and local public officials provide this financial assis-
tance with little information about the effects such efforts have on 
businesses or on state and local economies or about:why programs may 
have certain results. Many evaluations of such efforts exist, but the 
studies have rarely considered effects on nonmetropolitan areas. 
Programs aimed at encouraging capital investment in the state as a 
whole may have positive effects in depressed nonmetropolitan areas or 
may have unintended negative effects. Programs designed explicitly to 
help nonmetropolitan areas may do so, but positive effects may be at 
the expense of growth in other regions of a state. 
Most programs that subsidize capital investment have a variety of 
goals, only some of them explicit. In general, however, programs aim 
to increase the number of jobs available and to reduce unemployment. 
Sometimes programs aim to create or retain certain types of jobs--
"high tech" jobs, manufacturing jobs, or tourism-related positions, 
for instance. Usually, a program's implicit goal is to provide such 
benefits for the state as a whole. Therefore, the effects on 
nonmetropolitan areas are not intentional or planned. When programs 
do aim to help particular regions, state officials have not 
explicitly decided that they want benefits for one region at the 
9Marianne K. Clarke, Revitalizing State Economies: A Review of 
State Economic Development Policies and Programs (Washington, D.C.: 
National Governors' Association, 1986), pp. 3-4. 
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expense of other regions, although this can be an effect of such a 
program. 10 
Evaluations of Economic Development Programs 
The most common evaluations of programs to encourage economic 
development report the number of jobs promised when projects are 
funded or the number of jobs associated with particular projects as 
they are completed or approach completion. 11 For several reasons, 
such evaluations give an overly favorable picture of the effects of 
programs. One reason is that the financial subsidy may not have 
affected firms' decisions--the decision to locate in a specific 
place, an expansion decision, a decision to develop a new product, for 
instance. Instead, businesses may get the financial benefits of the 
program while they do what they would have done without the 
lOFor discussion of goals of state economic development programs 
see Michael I. Luger, "Does North Carolina's High-Tech Development 
Program Work?" Journal of the American Planning Association, vol. 50:3 
(summer 1984); Michael I. Luger, "The State and Industrial Develop-
ment: Program Mix and Policy Effectiveness" in John M. Quigley, ed., 
Perspectives on Local Public Finance and Public Policy, vol. 3 
(Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1987); Program Evaluation Division, 
Office of the Legislative Auditor, Economic Development (St. Paul: 
Office of the Legislative Auditor, State of Minnesota, March 1985), 
chap. l; Clarke, Revitalizing State Economies. 
11clarke, Revitalizing State Economies, pp. lOlff. For 
examples, see Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation, State-
Designated Enterprise Zones: Ten Case Studies (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of the 
Assistant Secretary for Planning and Development, August 1986); 
Legislative Budget and Finance Committee, Pennsylvania General 
Assembly, "A Sunset Performance Audit of the Pennsylvania Industrial 
Development Authority Pursuant to Act 1981-142," (Sept. 1986); Joint 
Committee on Review of Agencies and Programs, General Court of New 
Hampshire, "Sunset Report 1985-A, Economic Development and Banking," 
(Dec. 1984), p. 51. 
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program. 12 Even if the programs do affect firms' decisions, 
evaluations that count total numbers of jobs associated with projects 
give too optimistic a picture of the results of programs. Each time 
the state or local government spends public funds for a project, the 
funds could have been spent in other ways or not spent at all. Other 
programs would also have created jobs. No spending--and lowered 
taxes--would also have stimulated the economy. The net effect of a 
financial assistance program is the total change in the economy due to 
the program minus the effect associated with the best feasible 
alternative for stimulating the economy. The net job creation or 
change in economic growth can be positive--if the program is the best 
way to create jobs--or negative if another approach would have 
resulted in more jobs. ·Determining what results other programs or no 
program at all might have had is very difficult, and evaluations 
manage to do so with varying success.13 
A program to stimulate a regional economy within a state--
a depressed nonmetropolitan area, for instance--can suffer from the 
same pitfalls. Programs may not succeed in stimulating businesses to 
12For an explanation for why this might occur, see Bennett 
Harrison and Sandra Kanter, "The Political Economy of States' Job-
Creation Business Incentives," Journal of the American Institute of 
Planners, vol. 44, no. 4 (Oct. 1978), pp. 427-428. 
13Much of the literature on evaluation focuses on the difficult 
methodological issues such studies face. For example, Harvey 
Armstrong and Jim Taylor, Regional Economics and Policy (Oxford, 
England: Philip Allan, 1985), chaps. 14, 15; Robert H. Haveman, 
"Evaluating the Impact of Public Policies on Regional Welfare," 
Regional Studies, vol. 10, no. 4 (1976); Andrew M. Isserman and 
John Merrifield, "The Use of Control Groups in Evaluating Regional 
Economic Policy," Regional Science and Urban Economics, vol. 12, 
no. 1 (Feb. 1982). 
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make decisions they would not have made anyway. Other types of 
programs might provide greater job creation effects. Further, if the 
programs do succeed in increasing economic activity in the nonmetro-
politan area, they may have a negative effect on growth in the state 
as a whole because other uses of the funds would have led to more 
growth elsewhere in the state. 
The studies reviewed here are the best ones; that is, they have 
tried to take account of the issues outlined above and to estimate the 
net effect of financial incentive programs on state economic growth 
and occasionally on the prosperity of specific regions of a state. 
Only a few studies have examined effects on nonmetropolitan economies. 
The discussion below deals first with the methodology of evaluations, 
then with the effects of programs with no explicit focus on a 
geographic area, and finally with the effects of programs on a region 
within the state. 
Approaches to evaluation of programs. 
Evaluations of.programs take several approaches. The most 
common are surveys and statistical analyses. Important methodological 
problems plague most studies so comparison of studies' findings is 
difficult. Detailed analysis of methodology is necessary to account 
for differences in results, but published accounts often fail to 
include enough information on methods to allow such analysis. 
Surveys of firms come to different conclusions depending on the 
types of questions asked and how the survey is administered. For 
instance, in trying to determine whether financial assistance 
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influenced a location decision, researchers obtain different results 
depending on whether they ask, "What factors should be considered in a 
location decision?" and provide a list of possible factors; "What 
factors influenced your location decision?" with a checklist of 
factors; "What factors influenced your location decision?" without 
providing a possible list; or "Did tax incentives (or industrial 
revenue bonds or some other financial assistance) influence your 
location decision?" Questionnaire respondents may not have been the 
decision makers, and different individuals who participated in the 
decision often see the reasons for the outcome quite differently. Few 
surveys distinguish between the selection of a region and the selec-
tion of a specific site within a region. Surveys that find that 
incentives were "moderately important" in a location decision cannot 
conclude from this whether the assistance was instrumental in the 
decision. Further, the political climate in which the survey is 
conducted can influence the results. Managers may state, for 
instance, that financial assistance was important even if it was not 
in order to try to affect political decisions about whether to keep 
the program. 14 
14T. E. McMillan, Jr., "Why Manufacturers Choose Plant Locations 
vs. Determinants of Plant Locations," Land Economics, vol. 41, no. 3 
(Aug. 1965); David Mulkey and B. L. Dillman, "Location Effects of 
State and Local Industrial Development Subsidies," Growth and Change, 
vol. 7, no. 1 (Jan. 1976), p. 40-41; Thomas F. Stinson, The Effects of 
Taxes and Public Financing Programs on Local Industrial Development: 
A Survey of the Literature, Agricultural Economic Report no. 133 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research 
Service, May 1968); Michael Kieschnick, Taxes and Growth: Business 
Incentives and Economic Development (Washington, D.C.: Council of 
State Planning Agencies, 1981), pp. 52-58. 
13 
Statistical studies construct regression equations to explain 
changes in a selected measure of economic effects--for instance, 
average weekly wages in manufacturing, the stat_e unemployment rate, 
the percentage change in state employment over several years, or a 
complex measure of locational choice. 15 The difficulty of modeling 
such complex phenomena means that the equations frequently leave out 
variables that may be important. Therefore, the measures of the 
effects of incentives can be misleading. In addition, many studies 
construct an index to measure the level of financial assistance 
available from a state government, but whether the index appears to be 
significant in the equation does not show whether a particular assis-
tance effort embedded in the index influenced firms' behavior. For 
understanding the effects of financial assistance programs, a statist-
ical model should include a variable that represents the programs 
along with variables controlling for all other factors believed to 
affect the change in the unemployment rate, the growth of employment, 
or some other indicator of economic change. The model should reflect 
the way in which an economy is generally believed to operate. 
15Luger, "The State and Industrial Development: Program Mix and 
Policy Effectiveness"; Dennis W. Carlton, "The Location and Employment 
Choices of New Firms: An Econometric Model with Discrete and Continu-
ous Endogenous Variables," Review of Economics and Statistics, 
vol. 65, no. 3 (Aug. 1983); Michael J. Stutzer, "The Statewide 
Economic Impact of Small-Issue Industrial Revenue Bonds," Quarterly 
Review (of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis), vol. 9, no. 2 
(spring 1985). 
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The effects of programs that have no explicit geographic target 
Despite the methodological problems, some generalizations are 
possible about the effects of financial assistance programs. The 
following sections provide an overview of findings with respect to 
several questions. 
1. Do programs affect firms' decisions? 
Financial assistance programs rarely affect firms' location and 
expansion decisions. Numerous studies have investigated this issue. 
Such decisions can be conceptualized as occurring in three possible 
stages--the initial decision to relocate or expand, the choice of a 
region for location or expansion, and the choice of a site within a 
region. Financial incentives rarely influence the initial decision to 
relocate or expand or the choice of a region for location. The 
studies find that programs are unimportant compared to considerations 
regarding markets, labor costs and availability, transportation costs 
and access, availability of raw materials, and cost of land. 
Financial assistance programs do occasionally influence the choice of 
a specific site within a region, a site in one town compared to a 
similar site in a nearby town, for instance, where all other location 
considerations, such as labor force and transportation, are nearly the 
same. Sometimes the similar sites are on different sides of a state 
border, but even then both locations may draw on the same labor force 
and, therefore, the location decision may not influence state 
15 
employment. 16 According to one survey of large corporations, many 
executives chose not to use tax concessions because this could 
alienate the local population and because according to some corporate 
executives, "What they give with one hand, they can take with the 
other. 1117 
2. Do programs affect the level of growth in a state? 
Even if financial assistance programs have little or no effect on 
firms' location and expansion decisions, the programs can have effects 
on economic growth. The additional financing and the lower costs for 
the firm as a result of the subsidy can stimulate additional expansion 
that the firm would not have undertaken otherwise. However, unless 
the financing program corrects a problem in financial markets that was 
interfering with growth, the program may just move economic activity 
16 For example, see Margaret E. Dewar, "The Effects of Industrial 
Revenue Bond Programs on State Economic Development: Some Evidence 
from Massachusetts," New England Journal of Business and Economics, 
vol. 7, no. 2 (spring 1981); Gerald W. Sazama, "State Industrial 
Development Loans: A General Analysis," Land Economics, vol. 46, no. 2 
(May 1970); Benjamin Bridges, Jr., "State and Local Inducements for 
Industry," Part II, National Tax Journal, vol. 18, no. 2 (June 1965); 
Vincent P. Apilado, "Corporate-Government Interplay: The Era of 
Industrial Aid Finance," Urban Affairs Quarterly, vol. 7, no. 2 
(Dec. 1971); Ronald B. Gold, "Subsidies to Industry in Pennsylvania," 
National Tax Journal, vol. 19, no. 3 (Sept. 1966); Joint Legislative 
Committee on Trade and Economic Development, Oregon Legislature, 
"Industrial Revenue Bond Program Evaluation: Summary Report," Feb. 25, 
1985; Matthew R. Marlin, "Reevaluating the Benefits and Costs of 
Industrial Revenue Bonds," Urban Affairs Quarterly. vol. 21, no. 3 
(March 1986); Arthur Thompson, "Business Experience with Industrial 
Aid Bonds as a Source of External Financing: Some Empirical Evidence," 
California Management Review, vol. 13, no. 2 (winter 1970). 
17Roger W. Schmenner, Making Business Location Decisions 
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1982), p. 47. 
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around the state or, at worst, allocate funding in ways that deter 
overall growth. 18 
Research that investigates the statewide economic effects of 
programs shows small effects or no effects at all. Cost-benefit 
analyses that have properly accounted for costs have shown small 
positive effects. 19 (Some cost-benefit analyses have shown large 
positive effects on an economy but only when the analyses are based 
on the assumption that none of the firms would have existed without 
the subsidies.) 20 Statistical analyses have not shown any effects on 
indicators of state economic performance as a result of programs. 21 
18For more on the kinds of problems that might exist in 
financial markets, see Julia Mason Friedman, "Credit Market Rationing 
in Non-Metropolitan Market? for Small Business Loans," Working Paper 
88-02, State and Regional Research Center, University of Minnesota, 
Minneapolis, Minn., April 1988. 
l9Gerald W. Sazama, "A Benefit-:-Cost Analysis of a Regional 
Development Incentive: State Loans," Journal of Regional Science, 
vol. 10, no. 3 (Dec. 1970); Bridges, "State and Local Inducements 
for Industry," Part II; William E. Morgan and Merlin M. Hackbart, 
"An Analysis of State and Local Industrial Tax Exemption Programs," 
Southern Economic Journal, vol. 41, no. 2 (Oct. 1974). 
2°For example, see John E. Moes, "The Subsidization of Industry 
by Local Communities in the South," Southern Economic Journal, 
vol. 28, no. 2 (Oct. 1961); James R. Rinehart, "Rates of Return on 
Municipal Subsidies to Industry," Southern Economic Journal, vol. 29, 
no. 4 (April 1963). 
21Margery M. Ambrosius, "Effects of State Economic Development 
Policies on the Health of State Economies: A Time-Series Regression 
Analysis," paper presented at the Midwest Political Science Associa-
tion, Chicago, Ill, April 1986; Stutzer, "The Statewide Economic 
Impact of Small-Issue Industrial Revenue Bonds"; Luger, "The States 
and Industrial Development." 
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3. How do programs affect the distressed regions of a state? 
Few states design programs with the aim of encouraging the growth 
of specific regions of a state. When they do, their goal is 
frequently to encourage growth in areas that exhibit characteristics 
of economic distress, usually high unemployment. 22 A later section 
discusses research on the effects of programs explicitly aimed at 
certain geographic areas. Programs that are not aimed at certain 
regions still can affect regions quite differently. 
Programs such as industrial revenue bonds and tax concessions 
are used disproportionately in the growing areas of a state, a result 
consistent with the finding that financial assistance programs do 
not change firms' decisions. This means that distressed nonmetro-
politan areas may not participate in programs as much as would be 
expected from their share of state population. Indeed, a study of 
New Hampshire programs offering tax-exempt bonds, direct loans, and 
loan guarantees concluded that as tools for stimulating growth in 
underdeveloped sections of the state, the programs had been 
ineffective. In southern and eastern Oregon, firms that received 
industrial revenue bonds did not perform well in reaching their 
planned levels of employment. In Ohio industrial revenue bonds were 
used most extensively where unemployment was low and principally in 
the densely populated urban areas.23 
22clarke, Revitalizing State Economies. 
23Joint Committee on Review of Agencies and Programs, "Sunset 
Report 1985-A," p. 63; Joint Legislative Committee on Trade and 
Economic Development, "Industrial Revenue Bond Program Evaluation," 
p. 3; Thomas A. Pascarella and Richard D. Raymond, "Buying Bonds for 
Business: An Evaluation of the Industrial Revenue Bond Program," Urban 
Affairs Quarterly. vol. 18, no. 1 (Sept. 1982). 
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The effects of programs aimed at specific geographic areas 
In the United States, evaluations have found few effects on 
distressed areas from state financial assistance programs aimed at 
dealing with the economic problems of these regions. One reason for 
the lack of results is that when legislation states that programs 
should assist areas with certain characteristics of economic distress, 
the programs' implementation often does not carry out this charge. In 
Wisconsin, for instance, only about a third of loans for small enter-
prises went to counties with above average unemployment rates or 
below average income levels. 24 In other cases, evaluations have 
considered whether programs that were only a few years old were being 
implemented in a way that would allow them to achieve goals of helping 
certain regions. These studies have found that in some respects the 
program implementation showed promise; in other respects programs 
were being implemented in ways that set them up for failure in their 
goal of improving the economies of depressed regions.25 
Some federal government programs have aimed to help distressed 
areas with financial assistance programs. The Area Redevelopment Act 
24Legislative Audit Bureau, State of Wisconsin, "A Review of 
Small Enterprise Economic Development Program, Wisconsin Housing and 
Economic Development Authority," no. 86-42, Madison, Wisconsin, 
(Dec. 29, 1986), p. 3. 
25Program Evaluation Division, Office of the Legislative 
Auditor, State of Minnesota, Economic Development (St. Paul, Minn.: 
Office of the Legislative Auditor, March 1985); Margaret E. Dewar, 
"Development Analysis Confronts Politics," Journal of the American 
Planning Association, vol. 52, no. 3 (summer 1986); Julia Mason 
Friedman, "Improving Capital Market Efficiency Through State 
Programs," Research Paper E in The Report of the Governor's Commission 
on the Economic Future of Minnesota (St. Paul, Minn.: Governor's 
Commission, 1987). 
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(ARA), passed in 1961, provided commercial and industrial loans in 
depressed areas. The Economic Development Administration, established 
by legislation that replaced the ARA, provided a small share of its 
budget for business development loans. Evaluations suggest that these 
programs had little effect on the distressed regions' economies. In 
part, this was due to the small size of the program in relation to the 
capital that would have been required to have a noticeable effect on 
the regions. In addition, the programs tended to aid firms in the 
most prosperous areas eligible for assistance. Implementation of the 
programs to assure the financing of activity that would not have 
occurred otherwise proved difficult. Under the Economic Development 
Administration, loans to businesses were a minor part of the program 
because of congressional opposition that had resulted from activity 
under the ARA. According to a regional development specialist and 
former Economic Development Administration official, the constraints 
on direct subsidies to businesses reflected "the half-hearted 
commitment of Congress to local economic development as a means of 
improving human welfare. 11 26 
26sar A. Levitan, Federal Aid to Depressed Areas: An Evaluation 
of the Area Redevelopment Administration (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
Press, 1964), chap. 4; William H. Miernyk, "An Evaluation: The Tools 
of Regional Development Policy," Growth and Change, vol. 11, no. 2 
(April 1980); Benjamin Chinitz, "National Policy for Regional Develop-
ment" in John F. Kain and John R. Meyer, eds., Essays in Regional 
Economics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 36. 
A study that concluded that the business loans programs produced 
significant results is Raymond H. Milkman, Christopher Bladen, Beverly 
Lyford, and Howard L. Walton, Alleviating Economic Distress: Evalu-
ating a Federal Effort (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1972), 
pp. 110-114; but the methodology is not clear for determining that 
jobs were created that would not have existed otherwise. 
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Other countries have had more extensive programs to address the 
problems of distressed regional economies. Numerous evaluations have 
examined the effects of these programs in the United Kingdom. Signif-
icant regional development policy instruments went into effect in the 
early 1960s. Although measures of the magnitude of the effects 
differ, research on-regional policy in the United Kingdom consistently 
shows that the programs did redirect some economic growth to depressed 
regions. Measures of the effects of regional programs on the national 
economy show that overall growth was not slowed, although these 
studies are few in number and have faced particularly severe method-
ological problems. Financial incentives were part of the programs to 
encourage growth in depressed regions. Studies that distinguish the 
effects of the financial instruments from the effects of other kinds 
of programs show that financial aids also had a positive influence on 
growth in distressed regions.27 
27T. W. Buck and M. H. Atkins, "The Impact of British Regional 
Policies on Employment Growth," Oxford Economic Papers, vol. 28, no. 1 
(March 1976); Derek Diamond and Nigel Spence, Regional Policy Evalua-
tion: A Methodological Review and the Scottish Example (Aldershot, 
Hampshire, England: Gower Publishing, 1983); A. J. Brown, The Frame-
work of Regional Economics in the United Kingdom (Cambridge, England: 
Cambridge University Press, 1972); Armstrong and Taylor, Regional 
Economics and Policy; Barry Moore and John Rhodes, "Regional Policy 
and the Scottish Economy," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 
vol. 21, no. 3 (Nov. 1974); Barry Moore and John Rhodes, "Evaluating 
the Effects of British Regional Economic Policy," Economic Journal, 
vol. 83, no. 329 (March 1973); J. A. Schofield, "Macro Evaluations of 
the Impact of Regional Policy in Britain: A Review of Recent 
Research," Urban Studies, vol. 16, no. 3 (Oct. 1979); J. W. Dessant 
and R. Smart, "Evaluating the Effects of Regional Economic Policy: 
A Critique," Regional Studies, vol. 11, no. 3 (1977). 
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No one has considered why British use of financial assistance has 
had more favorable effects on distressed areas than American programs 
have had. Many explanations are possible. For example, the British 
programs were larger scale, lasted longer, and were aimed at particu-
larly depressed areas. Perhaps the British programs represented a 
more concerted, directed effort than the American programs did, and 
those characteristics led to more successful outcomes. 
Shortcomings of Existing Evaluations 
As this overview of the findings of evaluations suggests, 
evaluations of programs to provide financial assistance have been 
preoccupied with measurement of effects defined by numbers of jobs or 
numbers of firms affected by programs and have faced difficult, not 
always solvable, methodological difficulties. The results of the best 
studies are so consistent that additional evaluations of the same 
kinds can probably contribute few new insights. Because of the 
concern with measuring effects and with finding ways to solve methodo-
logical problems, evaluations have overlooked important issues 
related to policy formulation and implementation. Addressing these 
issues requires that studies ask different questions and take 
different approaches than in the past. 
A major goal of state and federal legislation aimed at specific 
areas is to distribute or redistribute economic growth to these 
regions. Evaluations address the question of whether programs have 
directed growth toward those regions, but they rarely ask whether such 
programs are the best ways to encourage the growth of regions or to 
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enhance the welfare of people living in depressed areas. Therefore, 
they give little or no guidance to decision makers on whether to 
choose particular types of financial programs or some other kinds of 
programs to achieve these aims. 28 If better approaches exist, much 
stronger cases need to be made for them in direct comparison with 
financial assistance programs. 
Further, the measures used to determine program results are 
narrow; they do not capture a range of important issues related to the 
restructuring of an economy. Numbers of jobs, numbers of firms 
affected, and changes in the unemployment rate are the measures of 
effects used most often. Some studies have also looked at the k.inds 
of jobs associated with the firms assisted by the programs in order to 
determine whether programs are stimulating the creation of high or 
low-paying positions. 29 When programs aimed at depressed areas look 
successful on the basis of measures of overall growth--as the United 
Kingdom's regional policy does--other considerations are especially 
important. These include the degree to which the programs are 
encouraging a new international division of labor. In the words of 
two regional development scholars, changes in the international 
economic structure "lead to changes in regional multipliers, patterns 
28 studies that do offer guidance in the choice of financial 
assistance programs do not use criteria that relate to maximizing the 
effect on a region's economic growth or to maximizing the improvement 
in the welfare of a region's people. For instance, William Hamilton, 
Larry Ledebur, and Deborah Matz, Industrial Incentives: Public 
Promotion of Private Enterprise (Washington, D.C.: Aslan Press, 1985). 
29For example, Milkman et al.; Levitan, Federal Aid to Depressed 
Areas. 
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of capital flow, technology, and innovation, changes in dependency 
relationships of individual plants as well as their degree of 
stability; in the sphere of labor markets they lead to changes in the 
qualitative structure of employment, the degree of diversity and 
stability of jobs, and to the formation of spatially segmented labor 
markets. 1130 Such qualitative transformations are difficult to 
measure, and complementary methodological approaches are not clear, 
but such change is extremely important for the longer term development 
of a depressed region. Studies that have begun to examine some of 
these issues show that British regional policy looks less successful 
than aggregate numbers suggest. 31 In the United States, data 
frequently do not exist for addressing such issues. Therefore, such 
research would involve time-consuming collection of information 
on the structure of a regional economy and the nature of its 
transformation. 
30walter Stohr and Franz Todtling, "Quantitative, Qualitative, 
and Structural Variables in the Evaluation of Regional Development 
Policies in Western Europe" in George Demko, ed., Regional Development 
Problems and Policies in Eastern and Western Europe (New York: 
St. Martin's Press, 1984), p. 159. 
31J. L. Morris, "The State and Industrial Restructuring: 
Government Policies in Industrial Wales," Environment and Planning D: 
Society and Space, vol. 5, no. 2 (1987); J. W. Dessant and R. Smart, 
"Evaluating the Effects of Regional Economic Policy: A Critique," 
Regional Studies, vol. 11, no. 3 (1977); Doreen Massey and Richard 
Meegan, The Anatomy of Job Loss: The How, Why and Where of Employment 
Decline (New York: Methuen, 1982); Richard T. Harrison, "Assisted 
Industry, Employment Stability, and Industrial Decline: Some Evidence 
from Northern Ireland," Regional Studies, vol. 16, no. 4 (Aug. 1982); 
Doreen Massey, "In What Sense a Regional Problem?" Regional Studies, 
vol. 13, no. 2 (1979). 
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Evaluations need not only a broader economic context but also a 
social, political, and institutional context. Few evaluations have 
sought to explain their results beyond suggesting, for instance, that 
cost considerations other than financial incentives dominate location 
decisions. 32 In order to suggest directions for decision makers, 
however, studies must include explanations for their results. These 
explanations should address several issues. 
First, many studies have found that financial assistance programs 
do influence a small number of firms' decisions. Some studies have 
measured the effects of different types of programs and found that 
effects differ, although methodology is problematic enough that 
findings are not trustworthy. 33 The small overall effects of programs 
may include some particularly successful efforts obscured in the 
overall numbers by many failures. Some programs may produce more 
successes than others. Explanations of the differences between 
successes and failures might suggest ways to structure programs for 
greater effectiveness. 
Second, suggestions for the reasons for program results depend 
almost exclusively on economic explanations. A program design 
inconsistent with the conditions that economists suggest are necessary 
for creation of new economic growth has little potential to succeed. 
However, the political and social context contributes greatly to 
32An exception to this generalization is Levitan, Federal Aid to 
Depressed Areas. 
33For example, Bridges, "State and Local Inducements for 
Industry," Part II. 
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whether programs with potential on economic grounds are adopted 
initially and to whether programs with potential do produce positive 
results. Evaluations have paid virtually no attention to how 
political and social factors could explain programs' success or 
failure. Studies of several programs to encourage economic develop-
ment in Minnesota suggested that the way in which the programs were 
adopted set up political opposition that sowed the seeds of program 
failure. Other research has shown that even if economic explanations 
for program failure are ignored, implementation problems can explain 
program difficulties. 34 
Finally, evaluations virtually never deal directly with the 
question of what should be done differently to make programs success-
ful or to affect economic growth in some other way. In order to do 
so, the evaluations would need first to address some of the issues 
outlined above and then to demonstrate how recommended changes would 
lead to more favorable results. 
These shortcomings in evaluations exist for important reasons. 
Taking account of the factors discussed above means that evaluations 
have to examine programs in depth; existing data sets cannot provide 
34Jeffrey Schneider, "Policy Formulation in State Economic 
Development: A Look at the 1983 Economic Development Fund Legisla-
tion," unpublished paper, Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs, 
Minneapolis, Minn., (April 1986); Robert Patrician, "State Policies 
for Community Economic Development: The Origins of the Community 
Development Corporation Program in Minnesota," a Plan B paper 
submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the M.A. 
degree, Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs, Minneapolis, Minn., 
(July 1987); Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron B. Wildavsky, Implementa-
tion: How Great Expectations in Washington Are Dashed in Oakland ... 
(Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1973). 
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enough information. This makes evaluation more expensive and more 
time-consuming although ultimately more valuable for policy direction. 
Such an approach to evaluation could not consider all programs in all 
states and offer the satisfaction of overall findings, but would have 
to examine a few prototypical programs in the richness of their 
economic, social, and political contexts in order to draw conclusions 
about results generalizable to other programs. 
